How can we drop the Theater from "Security Theater"?

Collecting data would be a good first step. [Link]

Over these last few months, I have grown increasingly frustrated with what I view as an unjustifiable intrusion on my privacy.   It was not so much the search (then) as it was the embarrassment of being singled out, effectively being told “You are different,” but getting no explanation as to why.

That frustration has been tempered by a combination of my desire to be a good citizen, and my empathy for the TSA screeners.  These folks, after all, are merely doing what we, the American traveling public, have permitted and now expect them to do.

I am left to wonder whether my own passive acceptance of these evolving search procedures has contributed to a potentially fatal dichotomy:  what weallow TSA screeners to do in order to maximize efficiency and enhance our perception of safety, or what we really need them to do in order to preserve our rights and dignity and enhance our actual safety.

We have asked TSA to find the tools terrorists use and prevent both from boarding a passenger plane.  We have unintentionally created an agency that now seeks efficiency and compliance more than any weapon or explosive.

While returning my computer and shoes to their proper places, I watched the screening line at BWI.  I thought about the haphazard events surrounding the security screening process.  As I watched the screening officers, I wondered what information drives their decisions.  Left only to my observations, I concluded that their decisions were entirely random, and likely based upon three criteria:  passenger load, staffing, and whim.

I was left to conclude that I am not screened because I look like a terrorist. I am routinely screened because I look like someone who will readily comply.  I decided then that my next invitation to enjoy additional screening would be met with more inquiry.

I did not have wait very long.  On my return through Albany to BWI — Surprise! –  I got “randomly selected” for additional screening.

This time, I was “invited” to step into one of the explosive detection machines, commonly referred to as a “puffer machine.”  The traveller is exposed to short, intense bursts of air, which are then, supposedly, analyzed for trace residue.

I read an article awhile ago that suggested these machines are entirely ineffective.   I have subsequently observed that they now sit idle at many airports where they were originally installed (Tampa International, for example).  In recently renovated airports (San Jose) they have not been installed.  At some other airports (like BWI), they have been replaced by the body-scanning technology.

The TSA needs to start doing the same data capture that police departments did to assess how "random" random searches actually were.